Dr. (Mrs.) Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, the honourable minister of finance and coordinating minister of the economy, has been given 14 days to answer a total of 50 questions bordering on establishing the veracity of claims of top government functionaries on the state of economy in relation to the reality of the situation.
In a letter to the minister, Chairman of the Federal House of Representatives Committee on Finance, Hon. Abdulmumin Jibrin, Ph.D. noted that she was invited to appear for a comprehensive presentation on the state of the economy, which became imperative because the committee has come to the conclusion that what senior officers from the executive discuss with them in private regarding the sad situation of our economy and the so-called dwindling revenue base contrasts with the positions they hold in the public arena.
The committee also observed that what the minister consistently tries to make the country believe as the true situation of the economy is at sharp variance with the reality on ground, hence after careful deliberation, the committee opted to itemize key issues requiring answers and clarifications from the minister.
The 50 questions listed by the committee, which Okonjo-Iweala must answer in writing within two weeks, are as follows:
“1. What should you consider as the major economic achievements of this government in the 2013 fiscal year and why? In your explanation, we will need facts and figures in demonstrating such achievements.
“2. You have been credited with many announcements regarding Nigeria's economy as one of the fastest growing economies in Africa. If the economy is one of the fast growing economies, what is exactly growing the economy? What role does government play in the said economic growth, especially given that as high as 80 per cent of the country's total annual budget spending still goes into recurrent expenditure?
“3. Since your arrival as Minister of Finance in 2011, you have publicly announced the need to reduce the recurrent expenditure so that more money would be made available to capital spending, which is critical to growing and diversifying the country's economy. How far has government succeeded in making these necessary cuts; and where exactly have these cuts been made in this effort to reduce recurrent expenditure? In other words, based on real amount spent on capital expenditure, how much reduction was made in 2011 against 2010, in 2012 against 2011 and in 2013 against 2012?
“4. You are known to be celebrating a single-digit GDP growth. But speaking recently at a breakfast dialogue with some members of the organised private sector in Lagos, organised by the Nigerian Economic Summit Group (NESG), you were quoted as saying: ‘We are growing, but not creating enough jobs. That is a very big challenge…We need to grow faster. I think it needs to grow at least 9 to 10 percent to drive job growth the way we want.’ Don't you agree that a good finance minister managing an economy like ours should be celebrating a GDP growth as high as 20 per cent annually? Why is it that our economy cannot grow beyond a single digit? How many jobs are being created as a result of these said growths? In which sectors of the economy are these jobs created? If in private sector, what contributions is government making to further assist these private sector firms?
“5. In the presence of Nigeria’s huge infrastructure deficit, why is it that the country's debt-to-GDP at about 19 per cent in 2012 remains one of the lowest in the world when compared to nations already with world-class infrastructure and industrial economies such as America’s 105 per cent, Brazil’s 65.49 per cent, India’s 67.60 per cent, and South Africa’s 40.9 per cent?
“6. Since facts don't lie, have you any disagreements with the th September 2013 Global Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Forum for 2013-2014, which ranked Nigeria 120th out of 148 countries ranked in the Global Competitiveness Index, including being ranked far behind some African countries such as Mauritius 45th, South Africa 53rd, and Kenya 96th?
“7. ‘For the first time in Nigeria’s 53rd year history, we have successfully privatised the electric power industry,’ so said the president at a recent meeting in London with some foreign investors. As Minister of Finance, should you agree that the recent privatisation of the country's power infrastructure is worth celebrating as a major economic achievement in 2013, when in reality there is little or nothing to show as an improvement in the country’s power supply? Also, why our rush to wholesale privatisation of the power sector when countries like South Africa, generating as high as 42,000MW still have their power sector mostly in public hands?
“8. What was your reaction to the 12th November 2013 statement credited to the World Bank Country Director for Nigeria, Marie-Francoise Marie-Nelly, who said that over 100 million Nigerians are today living in absolute destitution, representing an unheard-of 8.33 per cent of the world’s total number of people living in destitution?
“9. Nigerians are increasingly perplexed that these days nothing happens without government borrowing. And for most Nigerians, it is frightening how those managing the economy are just dragging us into excessively unproductive debts. More worrisome is the fact that every effort is being made to hide the details of the country's debt stock from Nigerians. Where are the facts that the country's current high rate of borrowing is productive, let alone have the ability to be repaid without having to resort to more borrowings?
“10. Is prudence in our borrowing simply reduction in borrowing or simply constructive borrowing with government putting necessary measures in place to ensure that domestic debt profile is properly supervised and utilised by curbing corruption?
“11. From Debt Management Office (DMO) 2012 Annual Report, the total public debt outstanding between 2008 and 2012 for external stock rose from $3.72bn to $6.53bn, while domestic stock rose from $17.68bn to $41.97bn. The total debt service the same period saw the percentage of external debt service drastically reduced from 11.46 per cent to 5.96 per cent while the percentage of domestic debt servicing grew from 88.54 per cent in 2008 to 94.04 per cent in 2012, drastically increasing the cost of the total debt service since the cost of domestic borrowing is atrociously higher than the cost of external borrowing. How could your debt sustainability analysis rationalize this without seeing some narrow interests being the overriding reason? Could this be the explanation why commercial banks in the country are declaring unheard-of three digit profits and the high Foreign Portfolio Investment and low Foreign Direct Investment?
“12. It's an established fact that the willingness and ability to borrow do not automatically translate into economic growth. If you agree with this fact, how productive are the country's recent borrowings?
“13. Why should our internal debts continue to represent more than two-thirds of Nigeria's external debt profile, when the cost of servicing domestic debts is ridiculously far more expensive than servicing external debts? Why should government continue to borrow internally when in so doing results in insufficient funds, skyrockets the cost of borrowing and above all, crowds out the real sector from the money market? Shouldn't the high cost of domestic borrowing override whatever are the assumed benefits? Since both London Interbank Offer Rates (LIBOR) and the US Treasury Bonds rates offer far better interest rates for sovereign borrowings, why have we continued not to take advantage of cheaper interest rates?
“14. Your references to the country's economic growth profile have always been based on Fitch, Standard and Poor's, and Moody’s ratings. Are you aware that these same rating agencies are being sued in New York (with case # 652410/2013) by two Bear Stearns hedge funds for fraudulently assigning inflated ratings to securities in the run-up to the 2008 financial crisis? If you do, why do you insist on accepting the rating as reliable?
“15. How much exactly has been the amount of money lost in government revenue as a result of import duty waivers in 2011, 2012 and 2013? Provide the names and beneficiaries and justification for same. In your opinion as the minister of finance who oversees the economy, what are the implications to the country's economy? What efforts have you have made to stop this waiver policy, which is distorting the economy? Our non-oil income has dropped in 2013, a case where increased tariffs on various items effectively reduced importation to zero in some sectors. However, those items now find their way into Nigeria through our borders. Does it make any sense to increase these tariffs when we have such porous borders? As an example, officially, Benin Republic imported more rice this year than Nigeria.
“16. It was reported that the FIRS is to engage foreign consultants for tax collection in 2014. Could the minister clarify this position and what Nigeria stands to gain? Have the FIRS not been working effectively?
“17. Do you really believe that Nigeria needs a 'Sovereign Wealth Fund' at this critical juncture of budgetary deficits, and having to be borrowing extensively in an effort to address government revenue gaps? Shouldn't the presence of Nigerian Sovereign Investment Authority (NSIA) simply mean spreading government's scarce resources thinly? Why will you insist that no matter what we still need to operate a sovereign wealth fund? Sincerely speaking, how sustainable are the objectives of Nigeria's Sovereign Wealth Fund, particularly in the long-term?
“18. You should agree that a lot of Nigerians are interested in the link between NSIA and the government. Since there is no doubt that Nigerian Sovereign Investment Authority is an agent of government — or is it not? The question is: How should we think about the management structure in so far as major decisions are concerned? Where is the line between NSIA, as a commercially minded entity, and the government, especially given government's policy of having no business doing business? If, for example, government does not get involved in specific investments, then, who appoints the external managers involved in managing some parts of the NSIA funds?
“19. Who determines the investment objective and who establishes the risk parameter for the NSIA's portfolio? In providing answer to this question, it is also important to understand and explain why NSIA recently hired a Swiss national as its chief portfolio investor? Answering this question is important since it should help us to know who determines the maximum draw-down that the government would be comfortable with in extremely negative market environments.
“20. What should be your explanations for awarding MasterCard a multimillion dollar National Identity Smart Cards, when there are indigenous ICT companies that not only have what it takes but would have done it cheaper and create local jobs at the same time?
“21. Have you taken into considerations how foreign company could use such information available to it to invade the privacy of Nigerians?
“22. What are reasons for SURE-P to give preference to Chevrolet cars for SURE-P taxis, when it is known that not only are such cars very expensive to maintain compared with Asian and European cars, they also are also not fuel efficient and not durable on our roads?
“23. Honourable Minister of Finance, you will agree that SURE-P is very important to the people of this country, taking into cognizance that it is the only thing they stand to gain from the increase on petroleum product pump prices almost two years ago. Who is in charge of the management of SURE-P and who takes responsibility for its successes and failures?
“24. You will agree that inasmuch as the interest rate regime is critical to the real sector borrowing decisions, most principal factor in making borrowing decisions is the business's expected rate of return on investing borrowed money? The question, without efforts to protect local businesses from their foreign counterparts, the high cost of doing business in Nigeria puts them at such a disadvantaged position that it makes no economic sense borrowing to invest in their local businesses, why should we expect private sector firms to be investing in the economy?
“25. You are quoted as saying, ‘Very soon, the US would become a net exporter of oil…So, it would be disingenuous for anyone to say that just because the price of oil has hovered at around $100 per barrel, it cannot crash…Lest we forget, as recently as 2008, oil prices crashed from a peak of $147 per barrel to $35 per barrel in a space of months triggered by the global financial crisis. Is the minority leader saying he has forgotten that?’ This forces one to wonder from which source should the US become that net exporter of oil, given that the US’s daily oil consumption was 18.7 million barrels with (10.6 million of which was imported daily) in 2012? Or should it be from the shale oil, which the International Energy Agency (IEA) demonstrates to be at two million barrels daily? In other words, given the IEA global oil price trajectory, can’t we agree that ‘there are many constraints on supply keeping pace with demand’, which means that within this decade, oil prices should always hover around $125 per barrel? Answering this question will help us understand why you insist on benchmarking the oil price for the 2014 appropriation at below $79 per barrel? In answering this question, would you also agree that as the global economy shifts from West to Asia, so will the appetite for global oil consumption shift from the West to Asia?
As crude oil continues to sell at $100-$110, how low will production have to fall for us to record a net loss or at what production level can we break even at a 2013 benchmark of $79.
“26. Do you agree that the Excess Crude Account as being operated by government is illegal and unconstitutional, especially given how it has been managed?
“27. Can you explain with clarity how the ECA is being operated? Also provide a statement of account of the ECA from 2011 to 2013? Also how much have we made in excess of the benchmark price from January 2013 till date.
“28. If there is nothing like Excess Crude Account, would you have been demanding lower oil price benchmark for the budget, especially when the executive arm of government around world is known for demanding more money from lawmakers in order to be able to meet government spending obligations, particularly capital spending. Why is the reverse the case in Nigeria only, notably since 2011?
“29. With respect to the Excess Crude Account and our Sovereign Wealth Fund again, there have been allegations and counter allegations on its legality. Assuming, for the sake of the committee’s enlightenment, the FGN alone saved its own excess in its ECA/SWF (which is about 52% of the Federation account) and the states and LGs get their funds in full compliance with the constitution, what would be the effect on the economy?
“30. Do you believe in the fight against corruption? If you do why has EFCC not been proper funded? Without properly funding the commission, how should it be expected to carry out its duties effectively?
“31. Can you confirm with figures if we have met our cumulative revenue projections for 2011, 2012, 2013, and if we have, how and if we have not, why? Also provide backup performance information under the various revenue-generating agencies—NNPC (Oil and Gas), DPR, FIRS, Customs, Independent Revenue and other anticipated and unanticipated revenues e.g. privatisation and sales of government properties etc.
“32. As Minister of Finance, are you familiar and comfortable with all the present business arrangements of the NNPC? Why were these business arrangements excluded from the MTEF, which used to be the practice? Provide all the present business arrangements, the parties involved, the share of each party, and justifications for such.
“33. Provide details of government stake in NLNG, all categories of revenue under the NLNG and total amount generated so far and evidence of remittances.
“34. Why do you always prefer a lower benchmark, which leaves government with wider deficits and your attitude of no qualms with domestic borrowings at excessively high interest rates to balance deficit as against our position of increasing benchmark to reduce deficit, which consequently reduces domestic borrowing, that frees up funds for the real sector of the economy, thereby bringing down the interest rate, increased private sector investments and creating jobs.
“35. What is the total amount expended by certain statutory agencies of government without appropriation for 2011, 2012, and 2013? Also provide aggregate appropriated expenditure for the same period. As the Coordinating Minister of the Economy, do you feel comfortable with allegations that almost equal amount of our yearly aggregate expenditure is being spent without appropriation, yet we are crying that the country is running short of revenue?
“36. Between 7th and 9th May 2014, it is expected that Nigeria will be hosting World Economic Forum on Africa. Who will finance this event and why? In concrete terms, what are the expected tangible benefits to the country in return to justify hosting such expensive event that will require lots of money for logistics, accommodations, security, especially given that South Africa that recently hosted the event has nothing to show for it.
“37. If you should for any reason say it will attract foreign investors, the question, then becomes, what kind of foreign investors are we talking about here because as we all know, no serious foreign investor needs to attend such a forum in Nigeria in order to recognize that our country should have been one of the world's favoured investment destinations had our perennial infrastructure deficit been addressed head-on?
38. Most of the developing economies like China, India, and Brazil that the world is today celebrating as economic success wouldn't have become this successful without adopting multi-year development plans. Why after knowing that their successes are as a result of carefully designed multi-year economic planning, we are yet to adopt such a multi-year development model? In other words, why wouldn’t you agree that Nigeria too needs that in order to move faster and more sustainably in its quest for industrialization and economic diversification and job creation for millions of the country's unemployed young men and women. Specifically, what concrete, visible strategic efforts and action are you taken to diversify our economy?
“39. As Coordinating Minister of the Economy, can you precisely clarify how much AMCON's debt exposure is and what its defaulting will mean to the country's economy?
“40. Why are we using the 10 to 15 years moving average to arrive at your 2014 proposed benchmark as against the traditional five to 10 years moving average we have always used? Is it because using the five to 10 year average will not give you the benchmark price you desire?
“41. This time last year you informed this committee that our external reserve position was about $48 billion and the balance on our excess crude account was about $9 billion. You also said that the plan was to grow these balances to about $50 billion and $10 billion respectively. However we are hearing that the balances have dropped to $43 billion and $3 billion respectively. And you are saying all is well?
“42. Crude oil projections for 2013 were 2.53 million barrels per day while actual figures as supplied by the NNPC/DPR/MTEF have averaged about 2.3 million barrels per day giving a shortfall of about 9%. Could this alone have caused such a drastic reduction in our reserves and savings positions?
“43. Is any money missing from our anticipated revenue from the NNPC in particular and oil industry in general. If there is, how much? If not, how come such issues emanate from high offices in the executive arm of Government? However, if the reconciliation figures is the issue, how long will Nigerians wait for the reconciliation to be completed. In other words, how long will the reconciliation last and the outcome announced?
“44. Referring to the pre-shipment inspection of exports act of 1996 and the Federal ministry of Finance export guidelines. If any good (oil, gas or non oil) is exported from Nigeria the exporter is compelled to repatriate these proceeds through the domiciliary account of a Nigerian bank. What has been the effectiveness of these laws? Is there full compliance.
“45. If there has not been compliance, would it not make it difficult for us to build up our foreign reserves?
“Could we not say that the main thrust of the CBN letter was that our foreign reserves are not growing even though there has been a consistent high selling price of crude due to the fact that huge funds are not being repatriated at all or are repatriated through the black market?
“46. Could we say that the issue is not so much that money is missing (which is yet to be determined) but that proceeds that should have found their way back to the Nigerian economy have grown wings or they fly in through the black market, allowing oil industry players have a field day making spreads of up to N7 per dollar in some cases.
“47. What is the minister’s take on the apparent stagnation of the economy as there seems to be very little job creation and growth in small businesses. Even though the Minister has read out growth figures before it is not telling on the average man on the street.
“48. Would the minister say that the various Government initiatives at job creation have not lived up to expectation as they affect only a very small part of the population?
“49. Wouldn’t the minister think that the private sector should be the main driver of job and wealth creation through natural growth of business and start ups being financed by the banking industry?
“50. If so, what does the minister think it would do for the local banking industry if this same pre-shipment inspection law and your own export guidelines are enforced to the letter. The oil industry in Nigeria is worth about $50 billion per annum. If even $10 billion of this passes through our local banks wouldn’t that give the economy a boost with banks now able to fund longer term and bigger projects?”
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Petrol Hits ₦1,470: ADC Warns ‘Nigerians Are Choking’
Nigerians are being pushed deeper into economic hardship as petrol prices climb as high as ₦1,470 per litre, with the African Democratic Congress (ADC) warning that families and businesses are being driven to breaking point.
The opposition party accused President Bola Tinubu’s administration of piling fresh pressure on Nigerians already struggling with soaring living costs.
In a strongly worded statement signed by its National Publicity Secretary, Bolaji Abdullahi, the ADC said the rising petrol price was triggering a chain reaction across the economy.
“President Tinubu has turned the petrol pump into an instrument of punishment for everyday Nigerians,” the party declared.
According to the ADC, the impact is being felt far beyond filling stations, with higher fuel costs feeding into transportation, food, electricity, education and business expenses.
‘NO MORE HOLES LEFT’
The party also cited reports of private schools increasing fees by 30 to 40 per cent, arguing that most parents have not seen comparable increases in their incomes.
“Parents are not earning 40 per cent more,” the ADC said, pointing to the simultaneous rise in fuel, food, rent, transportation and education costs.
The party said school proprietors were also under pressure from higher electricity bills, taxes, fuel costs, rents and salaries.
But it warned that the combined burden was becoming unbearable for households.
“At ₦1,470 per litre, petrol is no longer simply a commodity. It is a Tinubu Tax,” the ADC said.
The party further claimed that some Nigerians are now skipping meals, withdrawing children from school, delaying medical treatment and shutting down businesses because of mounting costs.
“Under Tinubu and the APC, Nigerians have been tightening their belts. Now, there are no more holes left, and people have started to choke,” the party said.
‘REFORM IS NOT WORKING’
The ADC also attacked the government's economic reform programme, arguing that policies that increase hardship without corresponding improvements in household incomes cannot deliver meaningful relief.
“A reform that continuously makes the people poorer is not working,” the party declared.
It accused public officials of demanding sacrifices from ordinary Nigerians while allegedly maintaining extravagant lifestyles at public expense.
“When parents must choose between feeding their children and educating them, the government has failed spectacularly in its most basic responsibility,” the ADC said.
2027 BATTLE LINE DRAWN
With the 2027 presidential election approaching, the ADC sought to draw a clear contrast between Tinubu’s economic policies and the programme proposed by its presidential candidate, Atiku Abubakar.
The party reiterated Atiku’s proposal to restore fuel subsidy while supporting domestic fuel production, saying this would help reduce the cost of transportation, food and production.
“Economic reform must serve the people, not sacrifice them,” the ADC said.
The party also warned the ruling APC not to mistake Nigerians’ resilience for approval.
“Our resilience must not become an excuse for continued cruelty,” it said.
The ADC concluded with a direct appeal to the President:
“Tinubu has had enough time and inflicted enough pain. The people are suffering, businesses are dying, and hope is becoming increasingly expensive. President Tinubu must act now. Don’t push Nigerians to their limits.”
Banks Shut 476 Branches as Nigeria’s Banking Landscape Goes Digital
Nigeria’s banks are rapidly abandoning the traditional banking model, shutting down hundreds of branches and cash centres as customers increasingly move to digital and electronic channels.
Data from the Central Bank of Nigeria show that banks closed a net 476 branches and cash centres between 2022 and 2025, cutting the country’s physical banking network by 8.8 per cent in just three years.
The number of bank branches and cash centres plunged from 5,410 in 2022 to 4,934 in 2025, signalling a dramatic shift away from brick-and-mortar banking.
The contraction has gathered pace in recent years.
Banks closed 37 locations in 2023, followed by a much steeper reduction of 229 locations in 2024. Another 210 branches and cash centres disappeared in 2025.
In effect, more than nine out of every 10 locations lost during the three-year period were closed in 2024 and 2025.
The figures, contained in the CBN’s 2025 Statistical Bulletin for the Financial Sector, cover branches and cash centres operated by commercial, merchant and non-interest banks. The data were sourced from the CBN and the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation.
Lagos bears the biggest hit Lagos, Nigeria’s financial powerhouse, recorded the largest decline.
The state had 1,602 bank branches and cash centres in 2022. That figure dropped to 1,532 in 2023, 1,521 in 2024 and just 1,444 in 2025.
That represents a loss of 158 locations, or nearly 10 per cent, in three years.
Despite the closures, Lagos remains overwhelmingly dominant, accounting for almost 29 per cent of all physical banking locations in Nigeria.
The Federal Capital Territory also suffered a significant contraction. Abuja went from 400 locations in 2022 to 362 in 2025, a decline of 38, or 9.5 per cent.
But some states experienced far more dramatic cuts.
Ekiti lost almost half of its banking locations, falling from 107 in 2022 to just 57 in 2025 — a staggering 46.7 per cent decline.
Enugu lost 44 locations, dropping from 162 to 118, while Oyo shed 41, falling from 237 to 196.
Other notable declines were recorded in Ondo, Plateau, Osun, Cross River and Rivers.
Northern banking centres also feel the squeeze
The contraction was not confined to the South.
Kano, for instance, initially expanded its banking footprint, rising from 164 locations in 2022 to 183 in 2024. But the reversal was sharp in 2025, when the figure crashed to 157.
Kaduna followed a similar pattern. Its locations climbed from 148 in 2022 to 164 in 2024 before falling back to 146 in 2025.
Yet not every state is losing branches.
Delta recorded the strongest expansion among the states highlighted, adding 23 locations and rising from 173 in 2022 to 196 in 2025.
Edo added 10, while Jigawa and Kogi gained six and five locations respectively.
A widening banking divide
The figures expose a striking disparity in access to physical banking infrastructure across Nigeria.
While Lagos had 1,444 branches and cash centres in 2025, Yobe had only 23, Taraba 26 and Zamfara 28.
Bayelsa and Gombe had 31 each, while Ebonyi had 32.
The imbalance underscores how heavily physical banking infrastructure remains concentrated in Nigeria’s major commercial and economic centres.
The bank branch may be losing its battle
The shrinking branch network comes despite the number of banks operating in Nigeria initially increasing.
The country had 32 banks in 2022, 33 in 2023 and 35 in 2024, before the figure slipped slightly to 34 in 2025.
That means the branch closures cannot simply be explained by a shrinking number of banks.
Instead, the figures point to a much bigger transformation: Nigerian banking is moving away from physical locations and towards digital platforms.
The CBN has itself been pushing greater adoption of alternative payment channels, particularly among farmers, traders, small businesses and informal-sector operators who may have limited access to conventional banking services.
Speaking at the 2026 CBN Fair in Lokoja, the Acting Director of Corporate Communications and Investor Relations, Hakama Sidi-Ali, stressed the importance of alternative payment channels in expanding financial access and stimulating economic activity.
The message from the numbers is even clearer.
The era of banking halls on every major street may be fading.
With hundreds of branches disappearing in just three years — and the pace of closures accelerating — Nigeria’s banking industry is betting increasingly on phones, apps, electronic payments and other digital channels rather than physical walls and counters.
For millions of Nigerians, the next bank branch may no longer be a building. It may be sitting in their hands.
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In The Spotlight
Editorial:The War Behind the War
Nigeria is building a bigger army. But if the reports of secret talks with Boko Haram are true, Abuja may be fighting a very different war behind closed doors.
Nigeria is preparing for war.Thirty thousand more soldiers. Four new Army divisions. More troops, more formations, more firepower. The message from Abuja is unmistakable: the insurgency will be crushed. But somewhere behind that declaration of war lies a far more uncomfortable possibility. What if Nigeria is also negotiating with the enemy?
That is the question raised by reports surrounding the release of roughly 360 civilians abducted in Borno State after the attack around Ngoshe. The government has not publicly acknowledged a secret ceasefire with Boko Haram. It has also denied allegations that ransom was paid. Those denials matter. So do the allegations.
Because if the reported arrangement is accurate, Nigeria's counterterrorism strategy may be entering a dangerous new phase—one in which the government fights insurgents in the open while talking to them in the shadows. And that is where the real danger begins.
The price of getting people home
For the families of the abducted, there is no grand strategy. There is only one question:Are they alive?
If negotiations helped bring hundreds of civilians home, families are unlikely to complain about the method. They wanted their husbands, wives, children and relatives back.That is the brutal arithmetic of hostage-taking. But governments cannot afford to think only about the hostage in front of them.They must also think about the hostage who may be taken tomorrow.
The allegation of a ₦5 billion payment, if ever substantiated, would therefore be explosive—not merely because of the money, but because of the precedent. If an armed group discovers that kidnapping civilians can produce cash, concessions or a pause inmilitary operations, kidnapping stops being merely a weapon.It becomes a business model. And Nigeria already has too many kidnappers.
The contradiction at the heart of Abuja's strategy
Here is the paradox. President Bola Tinubu is expanding the machinery of war at precisely the moment reports suggest that government-linked actors may have been talking to Boko Haram.
So which is it? War or negotiation? The uncomfortable answer may be: both. And perhaps that is not necessarily irrational.
Governments negotiate when lives are at stake. They gather intelligence through contacts. They explore defections. They communicate with enemies even while fighting them. Military pressure can strengthen a government's negotiating position. Negotiations can save lives while military operations continue elsewhere.
But there is a line between using talks as a tactical instrument and allowing negotiations to become a substitute for strategy.Nigeria must know where that line is.
The ceasefire question
A temporary halt in fighting sounds harmless until you ask what happens during the silence. Insurgents do not necessarily see a ceasefire as surrender. They can see it as breathing space. Time to move fighters.Time to acquire supplies.Time to recruit.Time to reorganise.Time to recover from military pressure.
In an insurgency, a few quiet months can be worth more than a few square kilometres of territory.
That is why the most important question surrounding the reported Ngoshe arrangement is not simply whether fighting stopped.
It is this:What did Boko Haram do while it stopped? If the group used the pause to regroup, then a humanitarian success may have carried a strategic cost.If it did not, then perhaps the negotiations achieved precisely what they were supposed to achieve. Nigeria deserves to know.
Who was talking?
This may be the biggest unanswered question of all. There is no established evidence that President Tinubu personally negotiated with Boko Haram. Claims of a secret presidential deal should therefore not be presented as fact.
But if government representatives did negotiate a truce, somebody authorised those contacts. Somebody decided that talking was preferable to shooting.
Somebody determined what could be offered—and what could not.That chain of authority matters.Because secrecy may sometimes protect an operation.
It should not become a permanent shield against accountability. The government does not need to publish intelligence that would endanger hostages or expose sources.
But Nigerians have a legitimate right to know whether their government has paid terrorists, granted concessions or entered into ceasefires.
The Army is getting bigger. The questions are getting bigger too.
Tinubu's decision to expand the Army reflects the scale of Nigeria's security crisis.Boko Haram and ISWAP remain threats in the northeast. Banditry and kidnapping continue elsewhere. The military is being asked to fight on multiple fronts across a vast country. Thirty thousand additional soldiers will not, by themselves, solve an insurgency that has survived nearly two decades.
More soldiers can provide manpower.They cannot automatically provide victory. And this is where Abuja must be careful.
A government cannot tell Nigerians that terrorism will be defeated while simultaneously allowing armed groups to believe that kidnapping can open the door to profitable negotiations.
That sends two messages at once. One says:We will fight you. The other whispers:But if you take enough civilians, we may talk. For an insurgent organisation, that distinction can be very profitable.
Boko Haram is not the only player
There is another complication. Even if Abuja could reach a workable understanding with Boko Haram, Nigeria's jihadist problem would not disappear. ISWAP remains a separate and formidable force.
The northeast is not a chessboard with two pieces. It is a shifting battlefield of factions, commanders, rivalries and opportunistic alliances.
An agreement with one group can change the balance with another. An insurgent who signs a ceasefire today may defect tomorrow. A faction that loses influence may become more violent.
There are no guarantees in this kind of war. The danger of teaching terrorists the wrong lesson.This is ultimately what Abuja must worry about. Not simply whether a ransom was paid. Not simply whether a ceasefire happened. But what lesson the entire episode teaches.
If the lesson is that civilians can be kidnapped, government officials can be summoned to negotiations, money can change hands and military pressure can be reduced, then Nigeria risks creating an incentive for more abductions.
The country cannot afford that. Nigeria's kidnapping economy is already too deeply entrenched. Every concession to an armed group carries the possibility of becoming an advertisement for the next one.
Perhaps the hardest truth is this.
After 17 years of insurgency, Nigeria may have to confront a reality that governments have repeatedly resisted:There may be no purely military solution. That does not mean surrender. It does not mean rewarding terrorists.It does not mean abandoning military pressure. It means recognising that insurgencies are political, social and economic conflicts as well as military ones.But if Nigeria chooses negotiation, it must negotiate from strength and with clear objectives.
If it chooses war, it must understand what victory actually means. And if it chooses both, Nigerians deserve to know what the rules are.The shadows cannot govern forever. The reported Ngoshe arrangement may ultimately prove to be something very different from the allegations now circulating.
The ₦5 billion claim remains unproven.The alleged ceasefire has not been publicly established by the Nigerian government.
Those distinctions matter. But unanswered questions matter too. Who negotiated? Who authorised it? Was money paid? What concessions were made? Did Boko Haram use the pause to rebuild? And most importantly, what is Abuja's endgame?
Nigeria cannot fight a 17-year war indefinitely while pretending that every problem can be solved by another battalion, another operation and another military communiqué. Nor can it negotiate in secret indefinitely and expect the public to remain in the dark.
President Tinubu is building a bigger Army.
That may be necessary. But a bigger Army is not the same thing as a clearer strategy. The real test is whether Nigeria can use military power, intelligence, diplomacy and negotiation without allowing any of them to become a reward for terrorism.
Because the most dangerous battlefield may no longer be the one where the guns are firing. It may be the one where, behind closed doors, the price of peace is being negotiated.
In The Spotlight
Mixed metaphors: Eating them young
On this page, I have praised former Minister Nasir el-Rufai for his work in the Federal Capital Territory.
As governor, I praised some of his work, including when he fired state teachers. I also criticised him when he became arrogant and presumptuous.
Powerful people tend to misjudge distance, in terms of how long they will remain powerful, as well as the depth of their relevance, measuring how power, once in the hands of others, can remain in their favour.
El-Rufai made both miscalculations. Following over two decades of untouchability in power from Olusegun Obasanjo to Muhammadu Buhari, he has now spent 200 days in pre-trial detention on ICPC and DSS charges.
This should not happen to a citizen, any citizen. But some citizens, when fate grants them the winning lottery ticket, become Cronus, the Titan in Greek mythology who, to maintain his power, swallowed five of his six children soon after birth.
But not Zeus, his youngest son, who miraculously survived and, becoming the supreme ruler of the Olympian gods and the “Father of Gods and Men, “would exact vengeance.
In power, el-Rufai forgot not only the principle of right and wrong, but also the concept of justice.
But it was right there the whole time: on the flip side of injustice. The truth is that wearing glasses to be able to see arms, nobody to see through clouds.
Last Tuesday’s disruption by political thugs of the visit to Benue State of Peter Obi, the presidential candidate of the Nigeria Democratic Congress, is an early reminder of the temptations of power in a Nigerian election year.
The ruling party controls the state, which is in the thick of Nigeria’s insecurity crisis. Its governor, Hyacinth Alia, is a Catholic priest. Having, in 2025, been involved in trying to prevent the same Obi from a humanitarian visit, claiming that his intervention was purely on security grounds, Mr Alia is trying to persuade the country that his are not the hands behind the crude attempt to stop, particularly Mr Obi, from travelling freely and safely in the state.
As Minister Festus Keyamo wisely said, this kind of menace is not a part of our democracy. Mr Alia, show the world your strengths, not your limitations.
Big news: the 2024 Auditor-General’s Non-Compliance report, published last month, identified over N1.34trn in audit lapses.
It found that the National Cash Transfer Office paid N33.751 billion to 3,295,207 households in 35 states in 2023 with no evidence that the money reached genuine beneficiaries.
The Office could not produce REMITA records to authenticate the payments. SERAP has written to President Tinubu demanding a published audit trail and investigation of the flagged N78.8bn in total irregularities.
Similarly, Femi Falana (SAN) has called on the EFCC to investigate and prosecute officials.
Given that we are dealing with a specific regime of governance coated in colours of ruthlessness, it is doubtful that these calls will yield anything.
The truth is that the situation is worse than what we know so far, and so, I have a different call: that Nigerians pay close attention to what is actually a long-running looting spree of our poorest and most vulnerable. There is a scorched-earth assault going on.
I begin in 2019, the start of the second term of the fake anti-corruption champion Muhammadu Buhari:
The Auditor-General’s 2019 report on the FGN Consolidated Financial Statements discovered that 36 MDAs made individual transfer payments,totalingN15,534,467,561.26, without identifying the beneficiaries, ignoring the relevant budget lines for “Transfers–Payment to Unemployed” and “Transfers–Payment to Aged/Vulnerable Group.” The Auditor-General flagged the risk of “diversion of public funds” and “misapplication of funds.”
The 2020 report is more curious. In the MDA-by-MDA budget-performance schedule, the National Social Investment Office shows: Approved Budget N0.00, Supplementary Budget N0.00, Total Budget N0.00, but the actual spending is N275,010,764,595.02! That is, the NSIO somehow recorded spending N275bn with no budgetary authorisation at all.
Surely, somebody has an explanation?
The 2021 Non-Compliance report, Volume II, found under the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs that N54,630,000,000 in N-Power Batch C1 stipends (the August–December 2021 backlog) was recorded as paid but, per the Auditor-General’s own field visits, “was not actually effected to the beneficiaries.”
The same section found N2,617,090,786 paid for the National Home-Grown School Feeding Programme (COVID-19 period), the Auditor-General recommending full recovery to the Treasury: a combined N58.05bn flagged in that one ministry in that one year.
Surely, somebody has an explanation?
The 2022 Non-Compliance file is titled as Volumes I and II merged, but despite that filename, Volume II appears to be absent, as it excludes Humanitarian Affairs, NSIPA, NCTO or NASSCO, meaning that their work was either not audited at all, or that that specific audit has yet to be published.
Again, and similarly, despite examining the two volumes of the 2023 Non-Compliance report, neither the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, NSIPA, NCTO, NASSCO, N-Power, GEEP nor school feeding appears anywhere, although many other agencies were thoroughly audited.
Surely, somebody has an explanation?
That brings us to the 2024 itemised findings SERAP has publicized: N33.751bn in cash transfers with no beneficiary confirmation; N36.744bn paid in December 2023 without prepayment audit; N4.616bn in unsupported expenditure which the Auditor-General says “may have been diverted”; N350.18m in enrolment payments to state coordinators with no supporting documentation; N89.51m for store items never delivered or logged; N17.42m in diesel cash advances with no traceable purchases; and at NASSCO, N2.24bn paid through 158 vouchers without prepayment audit.
These appear to be the patterns that Nigerian MDAs exhibit in their work every year, with vulnerable Nigerians exploited every year.
But the first challenge is for journalists to track Humanitarian Affairs/NSIPA through every audit year to establish the full carnage.
There is another crisis: that despite all of this, a lot of MDAs still fail to submit audited accounts to the Auditor-General, representing one of Nigeria’s worst accountability challenges. This is a problem that worsened significantly under the Buhari administration despite his anti-corruption rhetoric. According to the Auditor-General, the 2016 audit year saw the highest number of non-submissions (324) in modern Nigerian history: more than double the previous 22-year high of 148. In 2016-2017 alone, 436 agencies failed to submit accounts. Think about that.
President Bola Tinubu is in the middle of a three-week foreign trip, departing without formally informing the National Assembly or handing over to Vice President Shettima, violating the constitution.
For a man who is seeking a second term of office, this is a stark reminder of how little the rules, or for that matter, Nigeria, really matter to Mr Tinubu. Keep in mind that when he headed north, Mr Shettima headed south, to Angola.
The general debate of the 81st United Nations General Assembly will begin on 22 September. Mr Tinubu is scheduled to speak the following morning.
At a time of chaos and doubt in his leadership, and in democracy under his watch, he will confront the theme: “Restoring trust, managing transformation: a United Nations that delivers for all.”
By Sonala Olumhense