Erstwhile General Manager (Operations) of the defunct Nigerian Telecommunications (NITEL), Engr. S. O. Ogundele has absolved former Director General of the Bureau of Public Enterprise (BPE), Mallam Nasir El Rufai of blame in the ruin of the telco, instead identifying former President Olusegun Obasanjo, former Vice President Atiku Abubakar and former members of the NITEL Board as those culpable by their direct and indirections.
In a treatise emailed to Huhuonline.com, Ogundele also claimed that the collapse was unrelated in any way to the appointment of Messrs. Pentascope to manage the government telecom company.
The treatise, in full reads:
The Nigerian Newspapers, hard copies and online, and several web blogs and social media were awash on Tuesday April 2, 2013 with reports and comments, on the claims and counterclaims by the former Vice President of Nigeria, Alhaji Atiku Abubakar and Malam Nasir El Rufai the former Director General of the BPE on who or what ran NITEL aground. Nigerians will not forget in a hurry that the Nigerian Telecommunications Ltd. (NITEL) was Nigeria’s only telecommunications provider for almost half a century and by the time it was run aground more than six billion US Dollars that was invested in NITEL by the Nigerian tax payers through various governments went down the drain. Since NITEL became comatose, the Federal Government has behaved as if nothing has happened! Nigerians were left to be entertained by two of the dramatis personae in the NITEL saga dancing naked in the market place.
I wish to emphasize without any fear of contradiction that despite the irregularities that may have surrounded the appointment of Messrs. Pentascope to manage NITEL or the competence of Pentascope to undertake such an assignment at a point in time, Pentascope was not responsible for the bankruptcy of NITEL as being widely orchestrated to undiscerning Nigerians and divert attention from the real culprits, the criminal gang in the Nigerian telecom sector. The bankruptcy of NITEL was initiated by the criminal gang in the Nigerian Telecommunications sector long before the Management Contract of Pentascope to manage NITEL. Members of the criminal gang are mainly in the Nigerian Communications Commissions (NCC) and NITEL with some of them being failed NITEL Contractors. Their paymasters are the private telecommunications operators especially MTN. NITEL was already on the path to financial bankruptcy since 2001 because of the acts of commission and omission of this group.
Professor Bajoga the former Managing Director of NITEL and I were actually retired from service mainly because the criminal gang in the Nigerian telecommunications sector wanted us out of the way for refusing to play ball in allowing NITEL networks to be used free of charge by the Private telecommunications operators the same way Nigeria Airways was destroyed when Private Operators were introduced into that sector and used Nigerian Airways call sign and other aviation service facilities free of charge until Nigerian Airways went bankrupt. The NITEL saga is however more serious because the criminal gang in the telecommunications sector knew that they were deliberately undermining National security in the process.
International financial institutions are aware of the way and manner the Nigerian telecommunications criminal gang was scamming NITEL. This was why the consortium, International Investors Limited of London (IIL} and Transcorp had difficulties in raising funds to pay for NITEL transactions. The irony however is that the consultant to transcorp was the same consultant that produced the misleading and unintelligent report for NCC equating Interconnection as Termination for a reported fee of ten million Naira in late 1999 which formed the bedrock of the criminal gang’s scamming of NITEL.
I was the NITEL Deputy General Manager / General Manager (Operations) heading NITEL technical team on regulatory issues with NCC from 1994 until April 2000, I was fully aware of the criminal intent of the criminal gang against NITEL in flagrant violation of explicit Nigerian Laws and International Telecommunications Union (ITU) Recommendations on the issue of Interconnection. With my direct participation on the telecommunications regulatory issue I could predict NITEL’s bankruptcy since 2001. It is therefore morally reprehensible for anybody to blame Pentascope for an event already preprogrammed. Pentascope or their sponsors merely walked into the trap. A forensic analysis of the so called 100 billion Naira that Pentascope is being called to account for will be found to have been spent in part to settle the Private telecommunications Operators fraudulent invoices that NITEL was not in a position to certify albeit forced to pay against all the norms of commercial transactions.
The GSM operator, MTN was reported to the former President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki for corrupting the Nigerian Polity by Chief Obasanjo. Of Course, Thabo Mbeki insulted Nigerians and Nigeria by giving the former President Chief Obasanjo the diplomatic cold shoulder. Unknown to Obasanjo, at about the same time, MTN submitted a controversial bill of three (3) billion Naira to NITEL for settlement. NITEL correctly refused to settle the fraudulent so called traffic exchange bill based on call termination. Low and behold, MTN rubbed salt on injury of Nigerians with Tabo Mbeki’s rebuff of Obasanjo’s complaints by making Nigeria’s presidency MTN marketing and debt collecting officer! MTN routed the same bill that NITEL refused to settle through the PRESIDENCY which promptly acted like MTN debt collecting agency by sending the bill through the Ministry of Communications to compel NITEL to pay. Of course NITEL staff to please “the Oga on Top” promptly parted with three billion Naira. What the Presidency that should lead the nation in patriotic example did not know was that at the time MTN submitted the questionable bill of 3 billion Naira for NITEL to settle MTN was using 22 E1 (2x2MB) NITEL leased circuits to connect its Radio Base Stations in Abuja to Lagos where it had the Mobile switching Centre (MSC).without paying a single kobo to NITEL for those services. But NITEL provided same services to NNPC and other corporate bodies which they were paying for.
Presently corporate bodies that need the same E1 from MTN are charged N300,000 to N750,000 as monthly rental and there is the distance charge as well. On the basis of Current MTN charges which are much less than NITEL charges ten years ago, the amount that MTN owed NITEL for the 22 E1s from Abuja to Lagos was N(22x300,000x700x24) which amounts to 46.20 billion Naira or N(22x750,000x700x24) which amounts to 277.20 billion Naira assuming Abuja is approximately 700 Kilometers from Lagos and for a period of about 24 months as at 2003 when MTN used the Presidency to collect payment of about 3 billion Naira that should never have been paid to them.
Readers should please note that MTN did not need 22 E1 from NITEL to connect its network from Abuja to Lagos when MTN launched gsm services in 2001. Five or six E1s would have been enough but the criminal gang in NCC did not compel MTN to Install a Mobile Switching Center (MSC) in Abuja, the Federal Capital of Nigeria. Abuja had to depend then and possibly up till now, on REMOTE gsm numbers from Lagos just because MTN was given free use of NITEL E1s and Nigerians can now appreciate the huge loss of revenue to NITEL. ECONET had 18 E1s and Glo 15 E1s for the same purpose from NITEL with NITEL not earning a kobo because of the atrocities of the telecommunications criminal gang in NITEL and NCC. The example above is just for Abuja to Lagos. NITEL carrier network was used in a similar manner all over the country. Nigerians should appreciate the mind boggling loss to NITEL which is in excess of one trillion Naira!
Sections 17 1 an subsection (c) of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Act 2000 states “Any person who corruptly knowingly gives to any agent or being an agent knowingly uses with intent to deceive his principal, any receipt, account or other document in respect of which the principal is interested and which contains any statement which is false or erroneous or defective in any material particular, and which, to his knowledge, is intended to mislead his principal or any other person, is guilty of an offence and SHALL ON CONVICTION BE LIABLE TO FIVE 5 YEARS IMPRISONMENT”
The criminal gang in NITEL and NCC contravened this section of the ICPC act by corruptly:
1. Abandoning the 1997 Interconnection Agreement in 2001 without due process or lawful authority and deceitfully substituting another based on termination only, in flagrant violation of Section 15 (j) of Decree 75 of 1992 with the sole intention of defrauding NITEL having been compromised or corrupted by the Private telecommunications operators.
2. Deliberately misleading the NCC board with Interconnect Rate Determination Memo of 2nd December 2003, The Memo to the Board of NCC clearly and appropriately concluded that the Operator handling SINGLE TANDEM or DOUBLE TANDEM switching of telephony calls, which only NITEL the Dominant Operator was providing, should be entitled to 51% or 96% of the call charges. The Memo however deceitfully and deliberately left out prayers on the areas of benefit to NITEL thereby willfully allowing the Private Operators to withhold the 51% to 96% of the call charges that should have been handed over to NITEL. This created a huge treasure chest for MTN and others resulting in massive capital flight which did not escape the notice of Professor Soludo the former Cenral Bank Governor who raised an alarm in 2003. It is this capital flight that on round tripping the criminal gang in NCC orchestrate to Nigerians as foreign investment in the telecom sector. The criminal gang in the telecom sector really made big “Mugu” of Nigerians especially the Federal Government of Nigeria.
3. NCC was not competent by Decree 75 of 1992 to licence NITEL, a publicly owned company since NCC was empowered to licence only private telecommunications companies. The criminal gang in NCC however blackmailed NITEL into paying $200 million dollars for a National Carrier Licence along with Glo in 2002 with an EXCLUSIVITY PERIOD OF FIVE YEARS. Less than six months after NITEL and Glo paid about 20 billion Naira each for National Carrier Licence NCC unlawfully permitted MTN to install National Optic fiber network thus deliberately and deceitfully making MTN a National Carrier without paying a Kobo! MTN Optic fibre national network is therefore unlawful and illegal. No amount of manipulations by NCC can cure the illegality and Nigeria is the only country in the world where a major telecom operator flagrantly operate illegally and proud of it. This action of NCC has caused huge loss of revenues to NITEL and Glo and they both have the option of going to court to recoup their losses. It is pertinent to point out the after almost two decades of Operations in South Africa the South African Government did not approve of MTN as the Second National Operator when it decided to licence a Second National Operator. But the same MTN became a National Carrier in Nigeria within two years of operation as a result of unbridled and barefaced corruption carried out with impunity.
Some NITEL Board members have been using the Pentascope Management contract to orchestrate a campaign of calumny against Malam El Rufai to call a dog a bad name in order to hang it. But the real grudge the NITEL Board Members have against El Rufai was that El Rufai patriotically prevented NITEL from borrowing more than seven hundred (700) billion Naira under the guise of strengthening NITEL networks which the criminal gang were again to let Private Operators use free of charge in exchange for personal gratification. Where were the same NITEL Board members when NCC allowed MTN to encroach without paying a Kobo on the National Carrier License for which NITEL paid more than 20 billion Naira of borrowed money? Where was NITEL Board when Interconnection was being fraudulently interpreted as termination only to criminally shortchange NITEL?
NITEL Board must apologize to Nigerians and El Rufai and admit that it was not Pentascope Management contract that ruined NITEL but the criminal negligence and greed of its members that turned NITEL networks into free handouts to Private Operators for personal gratification. All patriotic Nigerians should support El Rufai for not allowing NITEL Board borrow additional 700 billion Naira only to be used as handouts to Private Operators for personal gratification or bribery and corruption in plain language. Nowhere in the world has deregulation caused a dominant operator like NITEL to go bankrupt. It is the criminal greed and corruption of NITEL and NCC Board members that RUINED NITEL. NOT PENTASCOPE!
Alhaji Atiku Abubakar as the then Vice President was fully in charge of Parastatals including NITEL and NCC so he should accept responsibly for the bankruptcy of NITEL. It was under his watch the presidency was used as the debt collecting agency for controversial and questionable MTN bills. It was also under Atiku’s watch that MTN was unlawfully allowed to set up National Optic fibre network free of charge the same Service NITEL and Glo paid more than 20 billion Naira for and was to enjoy EXCLUSIVITY PERIOD OF FIVE YEARS which MTN unlawfully and illgaly encroached on and STILL ENCROACHING! Dr. Ojeba another former Managing Director of NITEL was retired just when he was resisting the unauthorized abandonment of the 1997 Interconnection Agreement for the fraudulent one.
Alhaji Atiku Abubakar as the then vice president was the Chairman of the National Council on Privatization. On page 32 (PENSION Page) of THE NATION Newspapers of Monday, October 23, 2006 under the Caption “Govt. to pay NITEL’s N60b pension deficit”, the paper reported that the council at its 42nd meeting held on October 10, 2006 decided that the Federal Government will assume all historical and outstanding liabilities of 60 billion Naira arising from Pension Fund Deficit for NITEL and M-tel. It is expected that the BPE should have demanded the 60 billion from the Head of Service of the Federation. NITEL staff did not enjoy any part of the 60 billion. From the recent revelation surrounding Pension Fund Administration it is hoped that the 60 billion was not released by the HOS and diverted by unscrupulous elements in the HOS office or BPE leaving NITEL Pensioners to continue to wallow and die in poverty.
For the record, I have never met Alhaji Atiku Abubakar or Mallam El Rufai.
The current diversion of public attention by NCC from the consequences of the unstructured telecom network Nigerians are saddled with, is the Mobile Number Portability (MNP). Nigerians should note that it is the same NCC that supplied the World Telephone Numbering Guide with the following information about Telephone Numbering Format in Nigeria. Area Code, 1 – 2 digits; Subscriber Number, 5 – 7 digits; Trunk Prefix, 0; International Prefix, 009.
Only the 5 - 7 digits, which are the actual Subscriber Number, can be “Ported”. The Trunk Code and Area Code, which in Nigeria’s gsm network has been turned by NCC into Network Operator Code is actually 3 digits, cannot be “Ported” unless Nigeria wants to become the only country in the world without Area or Trunk Codes. This clarification is essential because the impression NCC has given Nigerians so far is that ALL THE DIGITS IN A GSM NUMBER can be “Ported” It is for this reason that all other countries that have implemented MNP insist it can only be effected in the Home Area of the Number so that the Area Code remains the same.
A Judicial Commission of Inquiry was set up into the administration of the Nigerian Airways when it was run aground like NITEL. Why not same for NITEL where the loss of public funds is much greater?
Nigerians are watching!
Engr. S. O,Ogundele
Former General Manager (Operations}, NITEL
Bamanga Tukur to Be Buried Sunday in Yola
Former Governor of the old Gongola State and former National Chairman of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), Alhaji Bamanga Tukur, will be buried in Yola, Adamawa State, on Sunday, September 13, 2026.
Tukur, a prominent elder statesman and businessman, died in Abuja on Saturday, according to a statement issued by his family.
His son, Awwal Tukur, the Secretary to the Adamawa State Government, announced the burial arrangements in a statement released in Yola on Saturday.
According to the statement, the remains of the deceased will be brought to Yola on Saturday ahead of the funeral.
The funeral prayers are scheduled to take place at the Lamido’s Palace in Yola at 10:00 a.m. on Sunday, after which the late politician will be laid to rest.
Tukur died just three days before his 91st birthday.
He was a prominent figure in Nigeria’s political and economic history, having served in several key public positions during a career spanning more than six decades.
Among other positions, he served as Chief Executive of the Nigerian Ports Authority (NPA), Governor of the former Gongola State and Minister of Industries. He also served as National Chairman of the PDP between 2012 and 2014.
Beyond Nigeria, Tukur played a role in promoting African economic development through organisations including the Africa Business Roundtable and the NEPAD Business Group.
The late elder statesman is survived by two wives and 18 children, including Awwal Tukur, the Secretary to the Adamawa State Government.
Northern Governors Mourn
The Northern Nigeria Governors’ Forum (NNGF) has expressed grief over the death of Tukur, describing his passing as a significant loss to the North and Nigeria as a whole.
In a condolence message issued on behalf of the forum, its Chairman and Governor of Gombe State, Muhammadu Inuwa Yahaya, described Tukur as an experienced public servant, political leader and advocate of economic development.
Yahaya said Tukur’s contributions to public administration, politics and business had left a lasting mark on the country.
He highlighted the deceased’s extensive public service record, including his tenure at the Nigerian Ports Authority, his leadership of the old Gongola State and his service as Minister of Industries.
The NNGF chairman also recognised Tukur’s involvement in continental economic initiatives and his leadership of the PDP between 2012 and 2014.
“Alhaji Bamanga Tukur lived a long and impactful life, serving Nigeria in several critical capacities and contributing significantly to the growth of our economy, institutions and political development,” Yahaya said.
He added that Tukur’s experience, wisdom and dedication to public service would be greatly missed.
Yahaya extended his condolences to the Adamawa State Government, the Tukur family, friends and associates of the deceased.
He prayed that Allah would forgive Tukur’s shortcomings, reward his contributions to humanity and grant him Aljannatul Firdaus.
News
Where & How to Buy Dangote Refinery IPO Shares
The Dangote Petroleum Refinery and Petrochemicals FZE is set to offer shares to the Nigerian public, giving individuals an opportunity to become shareholders in one of Africa’s largest refineries.
The public offer is expected to open on Monday, September 14, 2026, and close on October 13, 2026, subject to the final offer documents.
The offer comprises 4.1 billion ordinary shares at ₦525 per share, with a minimum subscription of 10 shares, costing ₦5,250.
Who Can Buy Dangote Refinery Shares?
The IPO is designed to give ordinary Nigerians an opportunity to invest in the refinery. Investors can subscribe through approved banks, fintech platforms, mobile operators, and NGX Invest.
However, investors should only use channels officially approved for the offer and should avoid sending money to individuals, agents, or platforms that are not listed in the official offer documents.
Approved Channels for the Dangote Refinery IPO
Banks
Access Bank
Ecobank
FCMB
Fidelity Bank
FirstBank
Globus Bank
GTCO
Jaiz Bank
Keystone Bank
Lotus Bank
PremiumTrust Bank
Providus Bank
Stanbic IBTC
Sterling Bank
TAJ Bank
UBA
Union Bank
Wema Bank
Zenith Bank
Fintech Platforms
Bamboo
Flutterwave
InvestNaija
Ladder
Moniepoint
Paga
Payaza
PiggyVest
Vetiva Invest
we.yan
Mobile Operators
Airtel SmartCash
MTN MoMo
Nigerian Exchange
NGX Invest
How to Buy Dangote Refinery IPO Shares
Step 1: Choose an Approved Platform
Select one of the banks, fintech platforms, mobile operators, or investment platforms officially approved to process subscriptions.
If you already use one of the approved platforms, check whether the IPO application option is available through your existing account.
Step 2: Open or Activate Your Investment Account
Investors generally need an investment or brokerage account to participate in the offer.
Depending on the platform, you may be required to provide identification, your BVN and other Know-Your-Customer information.
Step 3: Set Up Your CSCS Details
Shares listed on the Nigerian Exchange are held electronically through the Central Securities Clearing System (CSCS).
Your broker or participating investment platform should guide you through the process of opening or linking the necessary CSCS account.
Step 4: Fund Your Account
At ₦525 per share, the minimum subscription is:
10 shares × ₦525 = ₦5,250
If you want to purchase more shares, calculate the total amount based on the number of shares you intend to request and check the final prospectus for the applicable subscription rules and fees.
Step 5: Apply When the Offer Opens
The public offer is expected to open on September 14, 2026.
Log into your approved platform, select the Dangote Refinery public offer, enter the number of shares you want to subscribe for, review your information and submit your application.
Step 6: Keep Your Confirmation
After submitting your application, keep your application reference, receipt or confirmation for your records.
Step 7: Wait for Allotment
Applying for shares does not necessarily mean you will receive every share requested.
If the offer is oversubscribed, investors could receive fewer shares than they applied for. Any applicable excess funds should be handled according to the terms of the final offer documents.
Step 8: Monitor Your Shares After Listing
Once the shares are listed on the Nigerian Exchange, successful investors can monitor their holdings through their broker or investment platform.
The market price may rise or fall after listing, depending on the company’s performance, investor demand, market conditions and other factors.
Important Warning for Investors
Do not pay anyone personally to “secure” Dangote Refinery shares for you.
Before sending money or providing your financial information, verify that the platform you are using appears on the official approved list and that the application process matches the final prospectus and offer documents.
Investors should also review the official prospectus carefully, particularly the offer terms, fees, allotment rules, deadlines and risk factors.
Investment involves risk. The fact that an IPO is associated with a well-known company does not guarantee that the share price will rise after listing.
Business
In The Spotlight
Editorial: PFIPC: The Scandal Is Bigger Than Gbajabiamila (2)
The first question was: Who created PFIPC? Now Nigeria must ask a more frightening one:Who allowed it to look real? That is the question the Presidential Foreign Intervention Promotion Council scandal can no longer escape.
The controversy has already produced denials, accusations, official disclaimers, investigations and criminal proceedings. The Presidency has maintained that PFIPC was fictitious and that its alleged promoter, Prince Adeniyi Adeyemi Matthew, was falsely presenting himself as a government appointee. The Office of the Chief of Staff says it alerted security agencies as far back as October 2025 over alleged forged appointment letters.
Fine.Let the courts determine the criminal allegations.Let investigators establish who forged what, who authorised what and who benefited from what. But there is now another problem that cannot be dismissed as the work of one alleged impostor. The paper trail.
Because this story became truly explosive when reports emerged that the name PFIPC, alongside the Presidential Economic Advisory Council, appeared in the 2026 federal budget with an allocation of about ₦1.3 billion. Other reports also said the Office of the Head of the Civil Service of the Federation had approved recruitment for hundreds of positions linked to the council.
If those records are authentic, then Nigerians are entitled to ask a brutally simple question:
How does a supposedly non-existent organisation get into government paperwork? That question is bigger than Gbajabiamila. Much bigger.And it is precisely why this matter must not become a convenient contest between political camps.
The easiest thing to do now is to make this a story about whether the Chief of Staff was framed, whether he was wrongly accused, or whether his denials should be believed.
Those questions matter. But they are not enough. Because even if Gbajabiamila is completely cleared, the country will still be left staring at the same institutional wreckage.Somebody, somewhere, appears to have been able to give a questionable entity the appearance of government legitimacy.That is not a small administrative mistake.That is a security problem.
It is a governance problem. It is a financial-control problem.And, potentially, it is a national credibility problem. Think about the implications. An organisation carrying the word “Presidential” can sound powerful enough to impress businessmen, foreign investors, civil servants and even government officials.
A letter carrying the right government language can appear authentic.A title can sound official. An office address can create confidence. A meeting can create legitimacy.A photograph can create legitimacy. A budget line can create legitimacy.
And once enough of these pieces come together, fiction can begin to acquire the appearance of fact.That is the frightening part.The Nigerian state cannot afford to be protected by appearances. It must be protected by verification.
If PFIPC was indeed fabricated, then the sophistication of the alleged deception deserves serious attention. The Presidency itself said the alleged organisation had been presented as a government agency and that purported appointment letters carried falsified signatures, reference numbers and seals.That is not merely somebody printing a fake business card.That is an alleged attempt to manufacture the appearance of state authority. And the state must answer accordingly.
Who checked the documents? Who checked the appointment? Who checked the organisation's legal foundation? Who checked its place in the public service structure? Who checked its bank accounts?Who checked its office?Who checked its recruitment?Who checked its budgetary status?Who checked the officials supposedly running it?And, above all:Who had the power to stop it?Those are not partisan questions.They are state questions.
They belong to every Nigerian.This is why the PFIPC affair should now be treated as an institutional stress test. The result is uncomfortable.
The Nigerian government has demonstrated that it can publicly declare an organisation non-existent while questions simultaneously arise over how that same name appeared in official-looking government records.
Whatever the eventual explanation, that contradiction demands daylight.Not spin.Not political warfare.Not another round of accusations on television.Daylight.
If the budget entry was an administrative error, explain it.If it was inserted improperly, explain how.If recruitment approval was improperly obtained, explain who authorised it.If documents were forged, prosecute those responsible after due process.
If legitimate government officials were deceived, identify where the verification system failed.If insiders assisted the operation, expose them.And if no government insider was involved at all, then demonstrate clearly how outsiders were able to penetrate the machinery of government so deeply.
Nigeria deserves that answer.Because there is a dangerous habit in public life: once a scandal becomes embarrassing, the instinct is to find one person to carry it away.
Blame the impostor.Blame the politician.Blame the civil servant.Blame the opposition.Blame the media.Then move on.
That will not do this time.A country does not become safer because one alleged fraudster is prosecuted.It becomes safer when the system that made the fraud possible is repaired.That is the real test.
The PFIPC controversy has exposed a vulnerability that cannot be buried beneath another headline.
Government authority is an asset.It must be guarded.
The presidential name is an asset.It must be protected.Official documents are an asset.They must be secured.
The national budget is an asset.It must be beyond manipulation.And public confidence is perhaps the most valuable asset of all.
Once Nigerians begin to wonder whether an organisation can be invented, dressed in presidential language and somehow find its way into official channels, the damage extends beyond the immediate scandal.It reaches the credibility of the state.It reaches Nigeria's relationship with investors. It reaches the credibility of official correspondence.It reaches the confidence of foreign missions.It reaches the reputation of the civil service.And it reaches the fundamental question of whether government records mean what they say they mean.
That is why the authorities must resist the temptation to declare victory simply because an individual has been accused, investigated or prosecuted.
The deeper victory would be institutional.Find the loophole.Close it.Find the accomplices, if any.Expose them.Find the forged documents.Trace them. Find the money.Follow it. Find the approvals.Explain them.
Find the officials who failed in their duties.Hold them accountable, where evidence and due process establish responsibility.And then build a system in which the next PFIPC cannot happen.
Because there will always be fraudsters.There will always be con artists.There will always be people willing to manufacture influence. The real question is whether the Nigerian state makes their work easy.That is what Abuja must answer.
And this is where the story moves beyond Femi Gbajabiamila.If he is innocent of the allegations against him, then say so and let the evidence stand.But do not confuse the clearing of one man with the clearing of the system.One man can be innocent while a system is still guilty of negligence.That distinction matters.
Nigeria does not need another political scapegoat.It needs an audit of its gates.Who enters?Who leaves?Who signs?Who approves?Who verifies?Who pays?Who watches?And who answers when nobody watches?Those questions are now unavoidable.
The PFIPC scandal began as a dispute over an alleged organisation.It has become a test of something much larger:whether the Nigerian state can recognise itself when someone tries to impersonate it.That is not a scandal about one man.It is not even a scandal about one organisation.It is a warning about the machinery of government itself.And warnings ignored have a way of returning as disasters.
So let the investigation continue.Let the courts do their work.Let evidence—not political loyalty—determine responsibility.
But let nobody close this file merely because one powerful name has been cleared.The name may be cleared.The questions are not.
And until Nigerians know how an allegedly non-existent presidential body could acquire the appearance, paperwork and institutional oxygen of legitimacy, the PFIPC scandal remains unfinished. The mask may have been exposed. Now Nigeria must find out who opened the door.
In The Spotlight
Rethinking Policy From The Ground (II)
Last week, this column began with a simple proposition: Nigeria’s public policy conversation is often conducted at the wrong altitude. We examined why citizens encounter the state most directly through schools, primary health centres, rural roads, markets, transport systems, environmental services and local government offices. We also argued that a policy problem must first be understood before it is solved. Today, the column continues that argument. If knowing the problem is the beginning, the next question is what happens when a carefully diagnosed problem enters the political and administrative machinery of government. This is where incentives, institutions, competing values and frontline discretion determine whether a promising policy becomes a public good or another abandoned initiative.
From Problems Towards Choices
A government rarely chooses between a good option and a bad option. It usually chooses among imperfect alternatives, each benefiting some citizens, imposing costs on others and carrying uncertainties.
That reality should make policy analysis more rigorous. William K. Bellinger’s work on economics for policy analysis provides a useful discipline: the relevant question is not simply whether government can afford an intervention, but whether its social benefits justify the resources sacrificed elsewhere. Every new road competes with a school. Every government factory competes with health spending. For state policymakers, the essential question is therefore: what else could this money achieve? A N10 billion expenditure should be evaluated against the outcomes forgone by not spending that money elsewhere. That is the difference between accounting for expenditure and analysing public value.
How Incentives Change Behaviour
This reasoning becomes sharper when we consider how citizens respond to government decisions. Lee S. Friedman’s microeconomic approach to policy reminds us that people respond to prices, rules, risks, information and incentives.
Consider local taxation. A local government that increases market levies may expect higher revenue. But if the burden becomes excessive, traders may relocate, evade payment or operate outside formal markets. The government may collect less while economic activity becomes harder to monitor. Similarly, multiple charges on farmers, transporters or small manufacturers can make formal activity less attractive.
The same logic applies to environmental regulation. If government prohibits indiscriminate dumping without providing affordable waste collection, households may continue dumping illegally because the lawful alternative is inaccessible. Enforcement alone cannot solve an incentive problem created partly by inadequate service provision. Good regulation combines rules with feasible alternatives. The objective should be to make desirable behaviour easier, not merely punish undesirable behaviour.
Why Politics Shapes Outcomes
But incentives alone do not explain policy outcomes. Deborah Stone’s work on policy paradox reminds us that public decisions are contests over values as much as calculations of efficiency. Nigerian policymakers operate where questions of distribution are inseparable from development. Who gets the road? Which community receives the hospital? Whose land is acquired? Which informal operators are displaced?
These are political questions with technical dimensions. A policy that is economically efficient may still fail if it is perceived as unfair. A reform that improves aggregate welfare may provoke resistance from groups bearing concentrated losses. Politically intelligent policy design must therefore anticipate winners, losers and the narratives through which both interpret reform.
Urban transportation illustrates the point. Formalising informal transport can improve safety and service standards, but simply removing existing operators can create hardship for drivers and passengers. Successful reform recognises the economic lives embedded in existing arrangements and provides credible transition pathways.
Institutions Carry Policy Forward
Michael Howlett, M. Ramesh and Anthony Perl of the Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy remind us that policy is not a single decision, but a process involving agenda setting, formulation, adoption, implementation and evaluation. A brilliant policy document can therefore become a poor programme because institutions lack coordination, information, authority or capacity.
Nigeria’s federal structure makes this especially difficult. Responsibilities are distributed across federal, state and local institutions, while financing and administrative capacity are uneven. A primary school may depend on one level for teachers, another for infrastructure and another for complementary interventions. A primary health centre may receive medicines through one channel, personnel through another and capital investment through a third. When outcomes are poor, each institution can point elsewhere.
The answer is not simply to redraw constitutional boundaries. For policymakers, this means resisting the temptation to treat political urgency as evidence. Urgency can justify action, but it cannot substitute for diagnosis, comparison, measurement and institutional realism and learning. It is to make responsibility visible. Citizens should know which institution is responsible for which service, what standard it must meet and where complaints should go.
Frontline Officials Make Policy
Perhaps nowhere is this more important than where policy meets the citizen. Research on street-level bureaucracy shows that frontline officials possess discretion because formal rules cannot anticipate every circumstance. Teachers decide how struggling pupils are treated. Nurses prioritise patients. Extension workers decide which farmers receive information. Environmental officers determine which violations receive attention.
Where incentives are weak and supervision poor, discretion can become rent extraction. But discretion can also enable adaptation. A teacher may develop a practical method for reaching struggling pupils. A health worker may reorganise patient flow to reduce waiting. A local official may find a simpler way to process applications. The challenge is therefore not to eliminate discretion, which is impossible, but to create conditions under which it serves public purposes.
States should pay closer attention to the working environment of frontline officials. If a policy assumes that an extension agent will visit remote farms without transport, or that a teacher will improve learning without materials, or that a health worker will provide reliable services without medicines, the policy is not ambitious. It is institutionally unrealistic.
Governments Must Learn Systematically
Nigeria has no shortage of programmes, strategies and reforms. What it lacks is a sufficiently systematic process for deciding which interventions deserve to survive. Governments often scale programmes because they are politically attractive, not because they have demonstrated results. Others abandon useful initiatives when administrations change. This produces institutional amnesia, with each government behaving as though it is starting from zero.
States should identify what they believe will happen, establish measurable indicators, test interventions, compare results and revise assumptions. Local governments should become sources of operational knowledge rather than administrative endpoints. Successful innovations should be documented and adapted before scaling. Failures should be examined rather than concealed.
A state may discover that feeder roads produce larger gains in farm incomes than subsidised inputs in one agricultural zone, while another finds that irrigation, storage or market aggregation is the binding constraint. The goal should be a common commitment to evidence, with flexibility for different solutions.
Good public policy requires more than money, political will or impressive documents. It requires an accurate understanding of reality, careful choices among alternatives, attention to incentives, sensitivity to political values, institutions capable of implementation and systems that learn from results. States and local governments are where these conditions either converge or collapse.
Next week, the conclusion of this three-part series will move from diagnosis to action. The final column will set out practical policy recommendations and ways forward for state and local government policymakers, focusing on education, primary healthcare, rural livelihoods, rural industrialisation, transportation, and ease of doing business among several others.
By Abdulrauf Aliyu


